Can This Cargo Actually Move?
Tariffs tell you what a shipment costs. They do not tell you whether it can leave the country it sits in, whether the bill of lading actually leaves you holding title, or what happens when the load-port assay and the discharge-port assay disagree. Those three questions kill more deals than duty rates ever do — and none of them is written down anywhere convenient. This page is that page.
Coverage is set by where China actually buys from: the origin countries below are the leading sources for each commodity in China’s own customs data, not a general survey. 4 of these routes are currently closed outright.
Origin-country export controls
Closed routes first. A ban is not a price problem — if the gate is shut there is nothing to negotiate, and the next three steps never happen.
Raw ore export banned — this route does not exist.
Indonesia has banned raw nickel ore exports since January 2020 with no relaxation since, to force smelting capacity onshore. The effect shows in the data: Indonesia does not appear at all among China’s nickel ore origins — 61% now comes from the Philippines. If a counterparty offers Indonesian nickel ore for China, that claim is itself the red flag. What can leave is processed material — NPI, matte, MHP — not ore.
Bauxite export banned; Guinea took over the volume.
Bauxite exports have been banned since June 2023, on the same logic as nickel: domestic refineries can absorb the tonnage that used to be exported. China now sources 79% of its bauxite from Guinea and 16% from Australia; Indonesia has vanished from the list.
Raw lithium ore has long been banned; concentrate exports were reportedly suspended from February 2026 — re-check before any discussion.
Raw lithium ore exports have been banned since late 2022; concentrate exports were allowed at the time, with a further ban announced for January 2027 leaving only lithium sulphate and higher products exportable. On 25 February 2026 the government reportedly brought this forward by suspending exports of unprocessed minerals including lithium concentrate. Zimbabwe supplied about 15% of China’s HS 2530 imports (mostly spodumene) by value in 2024. If a counterparty offers Zimbabwean lithium concentrate for China, first ask who holds the export permit or exemption. This is moving quickly — go by the current notice.
Raw ore and concentrate exports suspended from 25 February 2026; only licensed miners with approved beneficiation plants may ship — traders are shut out.
On 25 February 2026 the government suspended all unprocessed mineral exports with immediate effect, citing malpractice in the export chain. The suspension names chrome ore concentrates, PGM concentrates, nickel concentrates and lithium concentrates, covers cargo already in transit, and runs until further notice. Only miners holding valid titles and approved beneficiation plants may continue to export, with a Provincial Mining Office recommendation; agents and third-party traders are explicitly barred from the export chain. On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Zimbabwe supplied 8.1% of China’s chromium ore in 2025 and 9.1% in the first seven months of 2026. If a trader offers Zimbabwean chrome ore for China, that claim conflicts with the current rules — first establish whether the exporter is the mine itself and who holds the beneficiation-plant approval. This is moving quickly — go by the current notice.
Export volumes capped from April 2026 — and four-fifths of China’s bauxite rides on this one country.
On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Guinea supplied 74.3% of China’s bauxite in 2025 and 80.8% in the first seven months of 2026 — a dependency still rising. Export volume caps take effect from April 2026, cutting an unconstrained run-rate of roughly 200 Mt to about 150 Mt a year, allocated by quota against three-year production plans, to support prices and protect smaller producers — while Guinea builds its own alumina capacity (five refineries planned, 7.2 Mt of alumina combined). This is not an admissibility problem but a volume-and-price one: long-term contracts need the cap written into the pricing terms rather than extrapolated from historical prices.
Export quota regime — whether they hold quota matters more than whether they hold material.
The blanket 2025 export ban has been replaced by quotas: 96,600 t for each of 2026 and 2027, of which 87,000 t is allocated pro rata to producers and 9,600 t is held at the discretion of the regulator, ARECOMS, to reward investment in local processing. ARECOMS has said quotas may be cut further if the market stays unbalanced. With 75% of China’s cobalt coming from the DRC, this quota is effectively global supply. The due-diligence question is not "how much material do you have" but "whose quota is this shipment moving under" — without quota, material that exists still cannot leave.
Tin concentrate flows (around a fifth of China’s imports), but origin compliance in the eastern provinces is a hard requirement.
Tin concentrate sits outside the cobalt quota regime. On Chinese customs figures (by weight) the DRC supplied 24.3% of China’s tin concentrate in 2025, second to Myanmar at 26.0%; in the first seven months of 2026 the DRC was 16.6% against Myanmar’s 36.7% as Wa State output restarted. The risk here is not the export licence but origin: material from the eastern conflict provinces needs traceability (ITSCI or equivalent), and downstream smelters and end customers enforce this harder than customs does. Cargo without origin documents clears customs and then gets rejected by the buyer.
Copper concentrate falls under the same downstreaming policy, but the deadline has slipped repeatedly — re-check before quoting.
Copper concentrate was folded into the same downstreaming policy as bauxite, but the effective date has been pushed back repeatedly because domestic smelting capacity lagged. Unlike nickel and bauxite this is not a stable ban but a repeatedly deferred deadline — treat this row as a prompt to check the current notice, not as the answer.
Raw-ore exports banned since 2022, with a 30% local value-addition law advancing — ask how far the material has been processed.
Nigeria has banned exports of unprocessed ore since 2022, and mining licences now require a local processing plan; further legislation mandating at least 30% local value addition before any raw material is exported is advancing, with criminal and financial penalties for breaches. On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Nigeria supplied 12.1% of China’s tin concentrate in 2025 and 8.0% in the first seven months of 2026 — enough to show that processed material does leave; what cannot leave is pit-to-port raw ore. For Nigerian offers, establish how far the material has been processed and what export paperwork exists: "I have ore" and "I have concentrate I can legally export" are different claims here.
From 21 May 2027, EU scrap can only go to non-OECD destinations on an EU-approved list — China included.
The recast EU Waste Shipment Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1157, in force 20 May 2024) phases in: most provisions from 21 May 2026, and the export rules from 21 May 2027. From that date, exporting green-listed waste (including copper and aluminium scrap) to non-OECD countries is permitted only where the destination country appears on an EU list — it must apply and demonstrate environmentally sound management — and exporters must commission independent audits. China is not an OECD member and falls under this rule. Practically: EU origins such as Spain (3.9% of China’s scrap copper in 2025) and Belgium (3.8% of its scrap aluminium) operate under a different regime after May 2027, so any contract spanning that date needs the point written in.
China’s largest origin for both scrap copper and scrap aluminium — but also a transit hub, with an expanding e-waste ban list.
On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Thailand supplied 13.8% of China’s scrap copper in 2025 (second to Japan at 15.4%) and 23.4% of its scrap aluminium (first); in the first seven months of 2026 it ranked first on both, at 16.2% and 20.4%. Domestic arisings cannot support that volume: much of it is European and American material routed through, plus secondary smelting capacity that relocated from Malaysia. Thailand’s prohibited e-waste list grew from 428 categories in September 2020 to 463 items by June 2025, and the market expects imports may be restricted to domestic end-users to squeeze out intermediary traders. As with Malaysia: establish whether "Thai material" originates in Thailand or merely passes through.
Wa State halted mining in August 2023; output has been restarting since late 2025 — recovering, not recovered.
On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Myanmar was China’s largest source of tin concentrate in 2025 at 26.0%, rising to 36.7% in the first seven months of 2026 — the restart is showing up in the numbers. Almost all of it comes from the Man Maw area in Wa State. The 1 August 2023 suspension cut supply off; shipments recovered to about 1,300 t of contained tin per month in Nov–Dec 2025 (against roughly 630 t/month in May–Oct), and in February 2026 the Wa authorities formalised dewatering cost-sharing across 11 mine portals, with further recovery from March. The uncertainty here is not policy but mine dewatering and local administration — confirm actual current shipments rather than treating nameplate capacity as available supply.
New mining law signed June 2026 bans exports of unprocessed and semi-processed minerals without ministerial authorisation — and half of China’s titanium ore comes from here.
Parliament passed a new mining law in May 2026 and the President signed it on 3 June: exports of unprocessed or semi-processed minerals are prohibited unless covered by a specific ministerial authorisation (based on an approved local processing plan), and the state takes a free-carried stake of at least 15% in every mining project. On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Mozambique supplied 49.2% of China’s titanium ore in 2025 and 54.2% in the first seven months of 2026; its share of zircon is smaller (5.0% in 2025, 15.9% in Jan–Jul 2026). Reporting does not name titanium or zircon specifically, nor spell out implementing regulations or a transition period — whether ilmenite concentrate counts as "semi-processed" is the key open question. Ask whether the exporter holds a ministerial authorisation before discussing terms, and write this into any long-term contract as a risk clause.
The transit route is tightening: COA plus SIRIM purity limits to get in, and a blanket e-waste import ban.
On Chinese customs figures (by weight) Malaysia supplied 5.5% of China’s scrap copper and 3.4% of its scrap aluminium in 2025, and the share is falling fast — copper was 8.6% in 2024 and only 2.9% in the first seven months of 2026, with most of that volume moving to Thailand. It functions largely as a transit and pre-processing hub rather than a source of scrap. All scrap imports now need a Certificate of Approval with slow inspections; aluminium scrap faces SIRIM purity thresholds (since 2021); and after roughly MYR 7 bn of illegal scrap imports were seized in 2025, e-waste is banned outright — with cargo sitting at Port Klang for close to two years in some cases. For offers claiming material "in Malaysia", establish whether it was generated locally or is passing through: for transit cargo the choke point is Malaysian entry, not Chinese.
Exports flow for now; the government has announced a ban on raw manganese ore exports from January 2029.
Gabon is the world’s second-largest manganese ore exporter after South Africa and supplied about 19% of China’s manganese ore imports by value in 2024. In late May 2025 the government announced a ban on raw manganese ore exports from 1 January 2029, giving miners a few years to build local processing. Spot business is unaffected today; any long-term contract running past 2029 must carry this as a risk clause. Implementation details may change — re-check before signing.
Exports flow for now; the government’s industrial strategy now calls for an export tax and quota on chrome — not yet in force.
On Chinese customs figures (by weight) South Africa supplied 82.5% of China’s chromium ore in 2025 and 80.4% in the first seven months of 2026 — like Guinean bauxite and Philippine nickel ore, one country carries an entire raw-material route. The revised Industrial Development Strategy published by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) in June 2026 sets the target to "institute an export tax and quota for the chrome industry", aiming to keep ore at home for ferrochrome smelting; the mining industry has pushed back hard, and at the time of checking this remains a policy target with no tax rate or quota in force. Spot business is unaffected today; long-term contracts should carry an export tax and quota as a risk clause. This is moving towards tightening — re-check before signing.
Open. The much-repeated "Philippines is banning nickel ore exports" never became law — the ban clause was struck out.
The Senate did pass a version of the bill in February 2025 banning unprocessed nickel ore exports by 2030, mirroring Indonesia — but that clause was subsequently removed from the mining bill, with the domestic industry association (PNIA) opposing it as premature. On Chinese customs figures (by weight) the Philippines supplies about 90% of China’s nickel ore (90.5% in 2024, 90.1% in 2025) — not one major source but effectively the whole of it. The route is currently open, but that concentration means a genuine reversal here would take out the entire raw-ore supply, not one origin. This status is a verified finding rather than an untested assumption — but it is also the row most likely to flip, so re-check it periodically.
Before shipment: documents and inspection
What these items have in common is that they cannot be fixed later. A quality certificate missing a field, or no third-party sample drawn before loading, leaves you with nothing to argue from once the cargo has arrived.
Import declarations for recycled copper raw material must be accompanied by a quality certificate stating the supplier name, material name, total metal weight, contained copper weight, and the national standard it is declared against — all five, or the certificate does not count. The notice also refers to a pre-shipment inspection certificate, but that requirement is not yet in force: it cannot be demanded as a legal obligation today, though it can be written into the contract as a commercial term.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 23 of 2024; SN/T 5416-2022 (Inspection protocol for imported recycled copper raw material)
This is fixed at the moment of loading and cannot be fixed on arrival. The notice states that different categories of recycled copper and aluminium raw material may not be mixed in one load, a single customs declaration may not cover more than one category, and different categories of bulk material may not be commingled — separately packaged material may travel together but must be kept segregated. In practice: a container holding both recycled copper raw material and recycled copper alloy raw material (different customs codes) is simply wrong, so this must be agreed with the seller before loading, not renegotiated on arrival.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 23 of 2024 (in force 15 Nov 2024, superseding No. 43 of 2020)
"Not solid waste" is not a label but a table with numbers. Recycled copper raw material (wire, mixed copper, granules): at least 97.0% metallic copper (98.0% for No. 1 and No. 2 granules). Recycled copper-alloy raw material (brass, bronze, cupronickel and high-copper blocks and turnings): at least 95.0%. Recycled pure aluminium, wrought aluminium alloy and cast aluminium alloy raw material: at least 91.0% metallic aluminium or alloy. Foreign matter no more than 0.8% in every case; hazardous waste no more than 0.01% of total mass; coated non-metallic material no more than 5% in recycled copper; no explosives, sealed containers or pressure vessels; dose rate no more than local background plus 0.25 μSv/h. Current tariff lines: recycled copper 7404000050, recycled copper alloy 7404000040, recycled pure aluminium 7602000040, recycled wrought aluminium alloy 7602000050, recycled cast aluminium alloy 7602000030.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 23 of 2024, Schedule; GB/T 38471-2023, GB/T 38472-2023, GB/T 40382, GB/T 40386
Since 1 August 2025 under Announcement No. 14 of 2025 (which repealed No. 78 of 2020), with classes following GB/T 39733-2024: ordinary, shredded, baled, recycled alloy steel (including stainless, tool steel and superalloy returns) and recycled cast iron. All five need at least 92.0% metallic iron and steel; foreign matter no more than 0.80%, relaxed to 1.00% for shredded; apart from shredded material, length up to 1500 mm and width up to 600 mm (1000 mm for baled and alloy steel), with oversize pieces no more than 5% of mass; hazardous waste no more than 0.01%; dose rate within background plus 0.25 μSv/h. Unlike copper and aluminium, one customs declaration may cover several steel classes, and classes may share a load if separately packed, physically divided or unloadable separately. Tariff lines: 7204100010 (cast iron), 7204210010 (stainless), 7204290010 (other alloy steel), 7204410010, 7204490030.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 14 of 2025, Schedule 2; GB/T 39733-2024
Since 1 August 2025, lithium-ion battery black mass meeting Schedule 1 is not solid waste and may be imported freely under tariff line 3824999996. Nickel/cobalt-bearing material: Ni+Co at least 25.00%, Li at least 3.50%, P no more than 0.80%, water-soluble fluoride no more than 0.40%. LFP material: Ni+Co no more than 1.00%, Fe at least 18.00%, P at least 10.00%, Li at least 2.00%, water-soluble fluoride no more than 0.10%. Both require a molar ratio of lithium to nickel+cobalt+manganese (or lithium to phosphorus and to iron) between 0.95 and 1.10 — aimed squarely at material that has had lithium stripped or been blended; Zn no more than 0.10%, and Pb, Cd, Cr and As each no more than 0.01%; +60 mesh fraction no more than 1.0%; no visible foreign matter and no pronounced pungent odour. Bulk shipment is not permitted, black mass may not share a load with other recycled materials, and one declaration may cover only one type.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 14 of 2025, Schedule 1; GB/T 45203-2024
Before shipment, a qualified overseas laboratory must test for radioactivity against GB 20664 (natural radioactivity limits for non-ferrous metal mineral products), with a bilingual Chinese/English report attached. This is a pre-shipment step, not something to be remedied on arrival — by the time an exceedance is found at the port, the cargo is already in China.
GB 20664-2006; China Customs field inspection requirements
Bills of lading and release
Get the other gates wrong and the deal falls through or earns less. Get this one wrong and the cargo and the money are both gone — the original bills still in your hands, the goods already collected. None of it turns on the commodity (the law of carriage is the same for copper, aluminium and molybdenum); it forks only between bulk and containers.
How the bill is made outWhether the paper carries title
Article 79 of the Chinese Maritime Code recognises three forms, with completely different transferability. A straight B/L (a named consignee) is not transferable. An order B/L (consigned "to order" or "to order of X") transfers by endorsement, named or blank. A bearer B/L transfers by delivery alone, with no endorsement.
What this means in practice: if you intend to resell the cargo afloat, or to use the B/L as security with a bank, the consignee box must read TO ORDER. Once it is issued as a straight B/L, that cargo legally goes to that one company and nobody else — and the consignee box is filled in at loading. Changing it after the vessel sails means surrendering the full set of originals for reissue, which in practice rarely happens.
Maritime Code of the PRC, Article 79
This is the single easiest thing to get wrong here. Under Chinese law a carrier that delivers without an original bill is liable, and a straight bill is no exception (Supreme People's Court interpretation on delivery without original bills of lading). Under the United States Pomerene Act, a carrier under a straight bill may deliver to the named consignee without taking up the bill at all.
The same document, the same wording, opposite outcomes: in China no delivery without surrender; in the United States the consignee identifies themselves and the cargo leaves. Applying Chinese experience to a US-bound shipment produces exactly one result — the originals are still in your hands and the cargo has already left the port. On US routes, control cannot rest on a straight bill: either issue it to order, or move the payment trigger earlier.
Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Cases of Delivery of Goods Without an Original Bill of Lading (Judicial Interpretation No. 1 of 2009); United States Federal Bills of Lading Act (Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C. ch. 801)
A single shipment often carries two bills: the Master B/L the carrier issues to the forwarder, and the House B/L the forwarder issues to you. Your House B/L gives you a claim against that forwarder only — the shipping line does not know you; it answers to whoever holds the Master.
That creates a structural exposure: if the forwarder is aligned with the shipper (or simply goes under) and the cargo is released on the Master side, your full set of House originals is worth nothing at the counter.
Checking it is simple: look at whose name is on the bill — a shipping line (Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO) or a forwarder you have never heard of — and whether the B/L number resolves on the line's own tracking site. Do this before money moves, not afterwards.
A company carrying on non-vessel-operating common carrier business in China — issuing its own bills of lading without owning ships — must register those bills with the transport authority and provide the required financial security; the registration number appears in the Ministry of Transport's published records.
The point is not that a registered forwarder is safe. It is the reverse: a company soliciting cargo in China and issuing you a House bill with no registration behind it leaves you with nobody to pursue. This matters less when we buy (the bill is issued at the other end) and a great deal when we act as intermediary, or when the counterparty asks to use "their partner forwarder in China".
Regulations of the PRC on International Maritime Transportation, provisions on bill-of-lading registration and financial security for NVOCC operators
Full-cargo bulk shipments (bauxite, nickel ore and the like) move on charter-party bills, usually printed on the face with "to be used with charter parties". The reverse is not a liner's standard terms but a clause incorporating the charter party.
Which means the operative terms of that bill sit in a contract you have never read — laytime, demurrage, where disputes are arbitrated. Container liner bills do not have this problem: their reverse terms are the line's published standard form.
So on bulk there is one extra step: ask for a copy of the charter, or at minimum the pages carrying the incorporation clause. "The charter is confidential" is not an abnormal answer — but then you know you are accepting the fixture without having read its terms.
What releases the cargoThe moment of delivery
A carrier that delivers goods without taking up an original bill is liable to the lawful holder of that bill (Supreme People's Court Judicial Interpretation No. 1 of 2009). That much is settled.
But read what it does not say. By the time judgment is obtained the cargo has been collected, sold, quite possibly consumed; and the defendant may be an offshore shell forwarder against whom nothing can be enforced.
So the correct use of this rule is not "I can sue" but "do not let it happen": the protection is in the earlier items — bills made out to order, knowing who issued them, keeping the originals — not in a right of recovery after the fact.
Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Cases of Delivery of Goods Without an Original Bill of Lading (Judicial Interpretation No. 1 of 2009)
A telex release is not a legal instrument but a practice: the shipper surrenders the full set of originals at the port of issue and authorises the carrier in writing to deliver without them at destination. Once done, the cargo belongs to the consignee named on the bill, and who physically holds paper is irrelevant.
There is nothing wrong with it in itself — on short routes, between affiliated companies, or once payment is in, it saves days. What goes wrong is always the same sequence: release first, payment second.
So treat it as a question of timing, not of paperwork. A telex release requested before funds have cleared gets one answer. And say so while terms are being agreed, not when the request arrives — by then the cargo is on the water and your position is at its weakest.
A sea waybill is non-negotiable and is not surrendered to take delivery — the named consignee simply identifies themselves. The Chinese Maritime Code has no dedicated chapter for it. Its one advantage is speed: nothing has to be couriered.
That makes its proper use narrow: payment already received, or shipper and consignee inside one group. An unfamiliar overseas seller proposing "a sea waybill to save time" is proposing that you give up control of the cargo. That is not necessarily fraud, but it belongs to the same family as a telex release and the test is the same: has the money arrived.
Containers get a period of free time at destination; after that the meter starts — demurrage while the box sits at the terminal, detention once it has been taken out and not returned — charged per container per day, on a scale that steps upward the longer it runs.
It belongs under "release" because it is usually the invoice for some other problem: documents not arrived, customs held up, an assay dispute unresolved. Every day of deadlock is billable, and the bill almost always lands on the buyer — our side.
So a dispute either gets resolved quickly or the cargo gets collected first and argued about afterwards: on a small shipment these charges can catch up with the value of the goods within weeks. Rates differ by line and by port, so no figures are given here — look up the tariff for the actual carrier; a number written down today is fiction in three months.
Documents and moneyMoney is lost in the sequence
Originals are typically issued in a set of three ("3/3 original B/L"), and all three have equal force: once any one of them is used to take delivery, the other two are void.
So "I will send you one now and the other two when you pay" is not a hedge — it hands over the cargo in full. Scans, photographs and PDFs are not originals; the one sheet that went into the courier bag is.
There are only two real forms of control: keep the entire set until documents and payment are exchanged together, or route it through a letter of credit and let the bank hold them. There is no safe middle setting.
Under UCP 600 a bank examines the documents alone, deciding whether they constitute a complying presentation on their face; it does not look at the goods.
Both edges of that matter. In our favour: a discrepancy means the bank refuses payment, so a credit puts the exchange of title for money in neutral hands. Against us: immaculate documents do not mean the cargo is right — a perfectly complying set covering a container of rubbish gets paid all the same. A letter of credit solves the payment-against-title problem, not the is-the-cargo-real problem; only pre-shipment inspection does that, and neither substitutes for the other.
UCP 600 is an ICC set of rules and binds the parties because the credit says it applies — which in practice it almost always does.
ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, UCP 600, Articles 5 and 14
The entire value of cash against documents is that hand-over and payment happen at the same moment, normally through a bank collection. The way it usually fails is not fraud but self-inflicted, one reasonable step at a time:
"send a scan of the B/L so I can start clearance", then "courier one original ahead and the rest after payment", then "the funds are on their way, please telex release, the demurrage is expensive".
Each step is sensible on its own and each genuinely saves time, which is why it reads as helpfulness rather than as a scheme. Together they mean the cargo is collectable and the money is not in.
There is one test: after this step, if the other side never replies again, can I still get the cargo back? If not, it was a payment decision, not a paperwork decision.
Known failure patternsStructures, not accidents
The cargo loaded late, the credit's latest shipment date has passed, and the forwarder is asked to date the bill inside the window. That is a falsified document, not an accommodation.
Why it matters on our side: an anti-dated bill makes the presentation comply, so the bank pays — while the real cargo is two or three weeks behind contract. By the time it surfaces the money has gone, and recovering it means first proving the date is false from the vessel's actual berthing record. That check belongs before payment.
The cheap version is to compare once: the B/L date against vessel movements on the line's site or AIS history. If they disagree the problem is bigger than a few days — a counterparty willing to anti-date is a counterparty whose other documents now need re-reading.
On FOB terms the buyer nominates the forwarder. When we are the buyer that is good: the party issuing the bill is one we chose and the chain is visible.
The same structure inverted is the classic loss suffered by Chinese exporters: the overseas buyer nominates a forwarder it controls, the cargo ships on that forwarder's bill, and at destination it is released without any original being surrendered. The seller holds the complete set and the cargo is gone, and the forwarder has no Chinese entity and no registration to pursue.
Two uses here. When we buy, insisting on nominating the forwarder is ordinary practice, not a hard line. When we broker a Chinese seller's shipment, "we have a forwarder we work with, it is easier" is the sentence to stop on — and then find out who they are and whether they are registered.
The cargo is loaded and the message arrives: make the consignee our affiliate in X, or switch it to a straight bill so clearance is easier there. The reason is always operational — customs, tax, a local entity — and often genuinely true.
What matters is not the reason but what the change does. Made straight, the cargo can go to that one company and cannot be resold (see the first item). Change the consignee and title changes hands. And at this point the money is usually still outstanding.
The right response is not refusal — sometimes the need is real — but treating it as a fresh negotiation of payment terms: yes, and if the resulting position is weaker than the current one, the money is settled first.
One more thing: once originals are issued, changing the consignee requires the whole set back for reissue. "Just amend it, no need to return the originals" means either they do not know that, or that set is no longer in their hands.
Each item above can be ordinary business on its own: telex release has legitimate uses, straight bills run on many routes every day, and a counterparty having its own forwarder is common.
The combination to stop on is this: the bill is issued by a forwarder you cannot trace; the consignee is named, or a switch to a named consignee is requested after loading; and before funds clear there is a proposal for telex release, a sea waybill, or "one original sent ahead".
All three together mean control of the cargo has been conceded a step at a time in three separate places — and the reason it is hard to see is precisely that each step has a sensible explanation.
The logic is the same as the red flags in due diligence: singly a warning, together a stop.
On arrival: customs and inspection
The cargo is at the port and someone else is now checking it against the rules. All you can do is know in advance what gets checked and declare it so it does not get held.
First a sensory (visual) inspection; if that cannot establish compliance with the schedule, testing follows the customs technical specifications or the national standards (GB/T 38470 recycled brass, 38471 recycled copper, 38472 recycled cast aluminium alloy, 40382, 40386); and where customs suspects the material is solid waste, it may commission a specialist body to determine its classification and act on that determination. The third step is the worst case — a solid-waste classification means the whole shipment goes back, not that extra duty is charged. Which is why the first step is not a formality: appearance, contamination, oil and loading method decide whether a cargo escalates that far.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 23 of 2024, Articles 3 and 4
Recycled steel, like copper and aluminium, gets a sensory inspection first and laboratory testing only where that is inconclusive; black mass skips the visual step and is tested directly against Schedule 1 under the customs technical specification. Radioactivity is checked under the customs special requirements. Where customs suspects solid waste, it may commission a classification and act on the result — and a solid-waste finding means return: under the Ecological Environment Code (in force 15 August 2026), bringing foreign solid waste into China leads to an order to return it and a fine of RMB 0.5–5 million, with the carrier jointly liable for return and disposal.
MEE and five other ministries, Announcement No. 14 of 2025, Articles 4 and 5; Ecological Environment Code of the PRC, Articles 1068 and 1112
Under the customs radiation monitoring procedure, a cargo fails if its gamma dose equivalent rate exceeds ten times the local environmental background. Note that this is a relative threshold, not an absolute one — the benchmark is background at the port of discharge, so in principle the same cargo could be judged differently at different ports. Field inspection simultaneously checks for excess inclusions and for prohibited or foreign matter, with anomalies sampled and sent to a laboratory.
GACC Radiation Monitoring Procedure; GB 20664
This is the most expensive trap in arrival disputes. Since GACC Announcement 159 of 2019, weight determination for bulk commodity imports changed from being performed by customs on every consignment to being performed on the importer’s application. Likewise, a customs quality certificate requires selecting the one-off complete declaration mode and ticking the quality certificate option at declaration. Both third-party records must therefore be actively requested. Without them, a short weight or an under-grade cargo leaves the buyer holding only the seller’s documents and its own assay — neither of which is a neutral third party. Weighing method: weighbridge for containerised cargo; weighbridge or draft survey for bulk.
GACC Announcement No. 159 of 2019
When the numbers differ: who wins
Each item is marked as either a rule — a regulation, notice or national standard you can cite and contract against — or a practice, which is what the trade usually does but binds nobody unless it is written into the contract. Getting these two backwards is how people lose arguments they should have won.
A gap between the load-port assay and the discharge-port assay is normal, not exceptional. Contracts usually handle it one of three ways: load-port assay governs (favours the seller); discharge-port assay governs (favours the buyer); or the two are averaged, with a third-party umpire assay if the difference exceeds an agreed splitting limit. The third is the standard construction in bulk mineral trade and the only one that does not systematically favour one side. A buyer who insists on "we will sort it out when it lands" or "the usual practice" is often perfectly genuine — but what they are preserving is the right to renegotiate on arrival. This is industry practice, not law: unless it is in the contract, either side can decline to be bound by it.
The usual split: the seller pays for pre-shipment inspection (they are proving the cargo is as described), the buyer pays for the arrival check (they are verifying it), and whichever party’s figure deviates more pays for the umpire assay. No specific prices are quoted here on purpose: inspection fees vary by commodity, port, lot size and agency, and change faster than the rules do — a hard number would be wrong within months. For a quote, ask SGS, CCIC or BV at the time rather than citing a figure that has been sitting in a file for six months. For scale, pre-shipment inspection is small against the value of a shipment: skipping it to save that cost is the worst trade on this whole chain.
Disputes over concentrate usually land on grade and moisture and are settled in money. Recycled copper and aluminium raw material is different: a solid-waste classification sends the entire shipment back rather than discounting it. The leverage is therefore all in pre-shipment control of the cargo’s condition (no mixed loading, no oil or foreign matter, categorised against the national standard), not in negotiating price on arrival. The first half of this item is practice; the consequence of reclassification is law — see the arrival item above.
Related: HS codes, duty rates and which subheading is admissible · Landed cost and the SHFE–LME ratio · Scrap grades and discounts
Export controls change faster than tariffs — a blanket ban became a quota regime in a matter of months in one case on this page. Every entry carries the date it was verified and where it came from. Confirm the current position before you commit to a shipment.